Qualityworld

Pioneering quality

The Twenty-third Pioneer Regiment Royal Logistic Corps based in Bicester, Oxfordshire provides a broad spectrum of logistic, artisan, low-level engineering and defence skills to commanders across the length and breadth of the battlefield. Over an 18-month period, the 600 strong regular army unit used a combination of quality concepts and military doctrine to develop its effectiveness. Lieutenant colonel Nigel Smellie, commanding officer of the unit, explains how he led the team on a quality mission

The regiment is a uniquely versatile organisation. Its hallmarks are professionalism and hard graft. The level of defence skills in the unit is second only to the infantry, and Pioneers are trained to provide the army war graves service. This is a harrowing task, involving the recovery and long-term burial or repatriation of the remains of those who fought and died in battle.

The regimental headquarters commands four 'task' squadrons and a headquarters squadron in peacetime. On operations, it is able to take under command a diverse logistic grouping, including elements involved with distribution and supply in the field.

Time for a change

In the 18 months following the government's 1998 strategic defence review (SDR), the regiment increased from three to four task squadrons and was issued with its own plant and a fleet of over 200 vehicles (equating to a tenfold increase). This provided a degree of self-sufficiency and tactical mobility previously unavailable, but brought with it a training and administrative overhead. The nature of low-level Pioneer tasks undertaken would not alter fundamentally but changes meant that there was now a need to prepare for larger-scale deployments and a shift in emphasis away from infantry skills. Collectively the changes enabled the regiment to meet the type of artisan, engineering and logistic support tasks that are in great demand on expeditionary operations.

In command

I took over command of the regiment in late January 2000. As commanding officer (CO), my level of responsibility is comparable to that of a magistrate (for military offences) or a chief executive. I am accountable for the performance of the regiment; setting the style, pace, policies and priorities of the operation. I inherited a unit with clear strengths - a deeply committed team of officers and soldiers with excellent morale. The deployment of over half of the regiment to Kosovo at the height of the campaign in 1999 demonstrated these strengths but exposed the need for change to enable the regiment to meet its revised role. A more skilled, equipment-orientated culture had to be created, without compromising the regiment's military capability.

My challenge was how to manage and implement the change. A number of options were available but the fundamental issue was to choose an approach and pace that was achievable given the constraints of time, money and military culture. The options I considered were not exclusively military based. I was broadly familiar with commercial management approaches and included as many of these as possible in my research.

The model I selected was a military process described in our doctrine as 'force development'; arguably the military equivalent of business process re-engineering (see figure 1).

Figure 1. The force development process

All in due course

Work to review individual training plans had already begun but we had to accelerate the pace. Deadlines were tight because, just before I assumed command, a decision was made at MoD level, with effect from 1 April 2000, that Pioneers would no longer undertake 14 weeks of infantry Training at Catterick. The regiment played vital role in redesigning the new training programme using the military's mandated 'systems approach to training'. This approach is illustrated in figure 2.

Fortunately we had individuals in the regiment who were experienced in designing and delivering training. Priority work was completed by the end of March 2000, to meet the April deadline. The entire process took almost a year and involved the introduction of three new courses and the redesign of a further two. The end result was a much more focused and phased set of courses, taking place over 18 weeks - the entire programme lasting seven weeks fewer than the previous regime.

The Army considers individual and collective training as separate requirements. Collective training is fundamental to achieving a cohesive and coherent military capability. Bearing this in mind, I undertook a detailed review and in July 2000 issued a completely revised and comprehensive set of standards.

Figure 2. The systems approach to training

Searching...for the right standard

Improvements can only be measured against a standard. All deployable Army units are assessed every six months using a tool known as the measurement of fighting power (MFP). A CO is required to assess his unit using a software-based questionnaire in terms of the three components (conceptual, physical and moral) of military capability. While this reporting mechanism has many strengths, it also has limitations: a number of the 41 questions asked are open to interpretation and several cannot be objectively measured. This means it is difficult to set and delegate measurable objectives in order to improve standards.

The search was on to find a standard that would support MFP but which was more specific and would allow ownership below CO level. Commercial quality models were unsuitable and I was reluctant to develop an in-house system from scratch. The NATO operational evaluation process (OPEVAL) was identified as a potential tool. We took the opportunity to visit a unit that had recently achieved success in an external OPEVAL audit. This confirmed to us that the more specific approach was suitable for our purposes and suitable for delegation.

A mechanism was successfully developed within the regiment to align the 38 OPEVAL standards with the 41 MEP questions. This combination was adopted and in late June 2000 an internal OPEVAL assessment indicated that 63 per cent of the grades were C or D (the lowest) and only 5 per cent grade A. This showed that despite the high quality of individuals and small teams, the overall quality of the organisation needed to improve dramatically - and quickly

Soldiering on

Few would argue that the armed forces cannot produce quality: all soldiers are in an organisation that, from the outset, presents the challenge to 'be the best'. However, there is no universal military quality doctrine. Although IIP has comprehensive coverage across the armed forces, ISO 9000, BPR, EFQM, TQM and balanced scorecards (for example) are mainly used in the higher echelons of the forces and 'quasi civilian', non-deployable bases. Quality theories are not widely considered in most field force units because their main command tools are tactical doctrine and generic procedures.

In the early months of 2000, the regiment was already subject to as much change as it could manage. I felt strongly that the forced use of unfamiliar commercial quality terminology and methodology would not work. However, I was also confident that many commercial quality techniques could be incorporated within the application of military doctrine and by minimising the use of unfamiliar jargon.

Implementation - clear missions and tasks

The first step taken was to identify clear missions and tasks for use across the regiment. Three study periods, involving key regimental staff and sub-unit commanders, completed this process down to squadron command level, during March/April 2000. Subsequently this approach was cascaded down to more junior commanders. 'Mission analysis' is the doctrinal term, but in this instance it was applied to the regiment's peacetime role - ie in preparing and training for operations - rather than the usual exercise or operational context.

These missions and tasks, along with other important co-ordinating instructions and priorities, were promulgated in my directive 2000. To date, the results of this analysis have stood the test of time. It was validated after the changeover of appointments, and every six months commanders report to me on their ability to meet them. The report looks ahead six months in detail and 12 months in outline.

The May 2000 directive declared my 'Endstate¹' on completion of my tour (July 2002), what my 'main effort²' was and what overarching concept was to be used as a framework for progress. It also included regimental short, medium and long-term objectives. A medium term objective was to issue a tactical doctrine note on the employment of Pioneers. The directive also included the proposal to issue a regimental plan.

Working towards a regimental plan

Although the equivalent of business plans have been in use within the higher echelons of the military for many years, the concept of business-like regimental plans is alien to most deployable military units.

A series of relevant performance indicators and measures were identified to suit the regiment's situation. Some of these were easily introduced; others required considerable effort. Constraints such as inadequate IT hardware and applications, limited IT skills and funds were overcome by utilising existing software packages, such as Excel, to minimise costs and the need for extra training.

The regimental plan 2000-2004 was issued on time. It promulgated my vision and contained several standing and progressive targets to be achieved by key appointment holders through to April 2004.

The plan is updated every six months after each six-monthly assessment of the regiment's military effectiveness. Each update includes:

a balanced scorecard with 20 key leading and lagging indicators
an updated SWOT analysis of the regiment's position (this adds intuitive balance to the performance indicators, measures and guidelines within the balanced scorecard and plan)
a 'longcast' (long-term forecast) - indicating key events (exercises, handovers of appointment, block leave) extending to the end of 2004
a 'synchronisation matrix' (an enhanced version of a Gantt chart) which shows key milestones of force development

The plan also contains three five-point overviews of my approach to what the Army describes as the three functions of command: leadership, control (roughly synonymous with management) and decision-making.

And the rest...

The directive and plan remain the cornerstones of the regiment's approach to raising quality but they are supported by several other key pieces of work. These include mandatory policy directives (health and safety, equal opportunities) and others that meet the specific needs of the regiment (performance appraisal, physical fitness and sport, adventure training, equipment care and so on). Care was taken to ensure that these were coherent with the directive and plan. Procedures for use on operations and exercises (standard operational procedures - SOPs) were developed and issued in April 2001 and day-to-day administrative matters were covered in regimental standing orders³ issued in July.

Last, but by no means least, was the introduction of regimental systems checks (RSC). These six-monthly checks are used, essentially as an internal audit of procedures. The emphasis was to identify possible best practice already in place at squadron level, although the checks also served to nip potential problems in the bud. Once the RSC results are consolidated and analysed, we prioritise corrective work and brief squadrons on those processes considered as best practice. Where appropriate, centralised additional training is provided under the auspices of the regimental sergeant major (RSM)⁴.

Debrief

Implementation of the RSC process marked the final stage of the Pioneers' quality approach. From start to finish, it took just under 18 months. In June 2001, the regiment's self-assessed OPEVAL grading indicated that D grades had been eliminated and C grades were down to 24 per cent. The regiment remained on track to reach its 30 June 2002 target of 68 per cent grade A and 26 per cent grade B assessments.

Notes

Doctrinal term: 'that state of affairs which needs to be achieved at the end of the campaign to either terminate or resolve the conflict on favourable terms.'.
Doctrinal term: 'the activity which the commander considers crucial to the success of his mission at that time.'
These contain obligatory local instructions for the general efficiency of the troops under command. Subject matter is mainly administrative. It includes security, education, families welfare, military custody regulations and mess rules.
The most senior soldier appointment in the regiment.

Biography

Lieutenant Colonel Nigel Smellie has been a Regular Army officer since 1974, serving the airborne and commando forces, as an ammunition technical officer in Northern Ireland and in a variety of other appointments worldwide. In 1992, he gained an MSc in logistics and distribution at Cranfield.

More recently, he served as an officer instructor at the Army's school of logistics and as a supply chain strategy staff officer within the Defence Logistics Organisation. He has enjoyed every appointment so far although that of CO 23 Pioneer Regiment is the best he's had to date!